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Jordan v. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 7 (2005).1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE —  
RESTRICTION OF COURT-ACCESS TO PROPER PERSON 
LITIGANTS WITH IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS 
 
Summary 
 
 Jordan v. State rules on two separate appeals that address the same issue of first 
impression regarding guidelines Nevada state courts must follow in order to restrict court 
access to in proper person litigants with in forma pauperis status.  This case also 
reconfirms the process by which in forma applications are reviewed. 
 In the first case, respondent Officer Jimmie W. Jones arrested proper person 
appellant James Jacob Jordan for trespassing on state property2 after Jordan did not heed 
Officer Jones’s warning to leave the premises.  After the trespass charge was dropped the 
following day, Jordan sued Officer Jones along with the Nevada State Department of 
Motor Vehicles and Public Safety for six different torts.  Jordan filed this action with the 
First Judicial District Court, Carson City.  After being granted leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis, Jordan filed various papers that the district court found incomprehensible and 
procedurally improper.  For that reason, the court ordered that Jordan be prohibited from 
proceeding without a waiver of fees in any new actions unless he obtained leave of the 
court prior to filing any new action.  A few months later, a joint case conference report 
regarding Jordan’s cause of action was filed.  The court granted the State’s motion for 
summary judgment because the court was unable to interpret the meaning of Jordan’s 
claims.  Jordan timely appealed his suit.   
 In the second case, proper person appellant John Luckett sued respondent Edward 
Doumani, owner of respondent La Concha Motel, for various torts in connection with a 
financial scam that Luckett claimed Doumani conspired in.  Luckett filed this action with 
the Eighth Judicial District Court, Las Vegas.  After Luckett was granted leave to proceed 
in forma pauperis, Doumani served Luckett with a demand for security costs under  
Nevada Revised Statute 18.130, which requires an out-of-state plaintiff to post security 
for any future adverse award of costs and charges.3  Doumani also moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.  After the allotted time to pay the costs expired, the court notified 
Luckett that he had thirty days to pay or the case would be dismissed.  The court then 
conducted a hearing on Doumani’s motion to dismiss for failure to pay and declared its 
intent to issue a restrictive order calling Luckett a vexatious litigant.  Luckett was then 
given three weeks to file an opposition before the next hearing.  After Luckett failed to 
attend that hearing, the court declared Luckett a vexatious litigant and noted that he had a 
history of filing unmeritorious pleadings, of claiming in forma pauperis status, and of 
traveling and gambling—thereby undercutting his claim of indigence.  Accordingly, the 
court granted Doumani’s motion to dismiss for failure to post security for costs and 
barred Luckett from proceeding in his action against Doumani without paying 
                                                 
1 By Daria Snadowsky 
2 In violation of NEV. REV. STAT. 207.200(1)(b) (2003). 
3 In accordance with NEV. REV. STAT. 18.130 (2003). 
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appropriate costs; the court also barred Luckett from filing any new litigation in Nevada 
state courts in forma pauperis unless he first obtains leave of the presiding judge in the 
court.  Luckett timely appealed his suit.   
In reviewing whether it was proper for the district courts to restrict Jordan’s and 
Luckett’s court access, respectively, the Nevada Supreme Court used an abuse of 
discretion standard and for the first time expressly adopted the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s four-part analysis for restricting court access,4 with some 
caveats.5  
The Nevada Supreme Court found that the restrictive order levied against Jordan 
did not comply with the Ninth Circuit’s guidelines and ordered it vacated.  First, Jordan 
was not given proper notice or opportunity to respond before the court restricted his court 
access.   Second, the district court did not include an adequate record of filings and 
rulings in similar cases that led the court to order the restriction.  Third, even though 
Jordan’s filings were difficult to understand, they were not without merit and should have 
at least warranted a preliminary evidentiary hearing as espoused by Spears v. McCotter.6  
Finally, the restrictive order against Jordan was unconstitutionally broad and seemed to 
bar him from filing any new actions in forma pauperis, regardless of whether the future 
action concerns a fundamental right.  (In addition, based on a de novo review, the Nevada 
Supreme Court overturned the district court’s grant of summary judgment because two of 
Jordan’s six tort claims were legally viable.)   
The Nevada Supreme Court found that the restrictive order levied against Luckett 
followed the Ninth Circuit’s guidelines more closely and was warranted.  First, Luckett 
was afforded notice and opportunity to be heard before the order was given.  Second, the 
record substantiated the court’s findings (however, some of the suits the court cited to 
were pending and therefore should not have been referenced).  Third, the court made 
substantive findings as to the frivolity of Luckett’s filings.  Finally, the court narrowly 
drew the restrictive order that required Luckett to obtain a presiding judge’s permission 
to make new filings.  However, the court should have explicated 1) a standard against 
which the presiding judge should evaluate any new filings from Luckett, and 2) which 
specific jurisdiction the restrictive order applied to—in this case, only the Eighth Judicial 
District Court.  Therefore, even though the Nevada Supreme Court found the restrictive 
order to be proper, it remanded the order for modification because it lacked a complaint-
review standard and wrongly attempted to apply to all Nevada jurisdictions rather than 
just the Eighth Judicial District.  In addition, the Nevada Supreme Court did find that the 
district court abused its discretion in dismissing Luckett’s action based on his failure to 
post security because the record contains no order expressly vacating the in forma 
pauperis order and no order was entered at a time early enough in the proceedings to give 
                                                 
4 De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1990). 
5 The Court explains that constitutional considerations preclude courts from completely banning filings by 
indigent proper person litigants if the ban thwarts such litigants from proceeding in criminal case and in 
original civil actions that involves fundamental rights.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. Dist. Court, 111 Nev. 1367, 
904 P.2d 1039 (1995).  And although a judge should look to other cases in making a record supporting its 
decision to restrict court access, that judge should rely only on her own observations from cases she is 
assigned to and the documents from cases that have already been ruled on, not that are still pending.  See, 
e.g., Rohlfling v Dist. Court, 106 Nev. 902, 803 P.2d 659 (1990) (recognizing that, generally, a district 
court judge lacks authority to review the orders of another judge). 
6 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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Luckett any opportunity to respond by posting security; instead, the Nevada Supreme 
Court affirmed the dismissal of Luckett’s action for failure to state a claim.    
 
 
Issues and Dispositions 
 
Issues 
 
May a Nevada district court restrict court access to a proper person litigant with in 
forma pauperis status? 
  
Must a Nevada district court review an application for in forma pauperis prior to 
reviewing an attached complaint? 
 
Dispositions 
 
Yes.  In deciding under what circumstances to restrict court access, the Nevada 
district court must follow the United State’s Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 
guidelines, which serve to protect the litigant’s constitutional rights. 
 
Yes.  A court must review the merits of an in forma pauperis application prior to 
an attached complaint.  This disposition is despite the fact that Nevada largely follows the 
United States’s Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s case Spears v. McCotter, which 
allows for simultaneous review of an in forma pauperis application and the attached 
complaint. 
 
 
Commentary 
 
State of law before Jordan 
 
Prior to Jordan and to this day, Nevada facilitates direct access to its state courts 
by permitting self-representation in all lower courts7 and allowing indigent people to seek 
in forma pauperis status, thereby relieving them of court costs and fees.8  The potential 
negative aspects of these measures is that the judicial remedies of professional discipline 
and monetary sanctions pose no deterrent effect to proper person litigants or in forma 
pauperis litigants, respectively, who pursue abusive litigation practices.  Nevada Courts 
compensate for this by various proactive methods, two of which include restriction of 
court access and the pre-service complaint review.   
Prior to Jordan, the Nevada Supreme Court had never addressed what approach 
courts should take when deciding whether a litigant’s behavior warrants restricted access 
to courts.  In order to combat abusive litigation, Nevada courts already had the power to 
impose sanctions on litigants,9 or in extreme cases, permanently restrict a litigant’s right 
                                                 
7 NEV. SUP. CT. R. 44. 
8 NEV. REV. STAT.  12.015 (2003). 
9 NEV. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). 
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to access the courts.10  This is despite the fact that Nevada, unlike other states,11 has no 
court rules or statutes authorizing a court to declare a litigant “vexatious” and to limit that 
individual’s access to the courts.  Jordan gives Nevada courts a specific and multifaceted 
formula to follow for the purpose of ordering restricted court access to a litigant.   
Prior to Jordan, the Nevada courts reviewed in forma pauperis applications prior 
to the attached complaint.  This is termed the pre-service complaint review. When a 
litigant files an in forma pauperis application along with a complaint, the Nevada district 
court first rules on the merits of the application.12  After the application is accepted, or the 
party, not deemed indigent, pays the appropriate costs, the court then allows the 
complaint to be filed and reviews it.  If the complaint appears completely frivolous on its 
face, the court may hold a preliminary evidentiary hearing with the litigant to determine 
whether the action should proceed.  If the complaint’s defects are at all curable, the court 
will permit the litigant to amend the complaint; only if the complaint is completely 
baseless may the court dismiss it.13  The purpose of this process is to help the litigant in 
crafting a more legally viable complaint, or in the alternative, to spare the litigant from 
pursuing irredeemably frivolous legal action.  Jordan does not change this process, just 
merely reconfirms it. 
  
Other Jurisdictions — The Ninth Circuit’s Approach to restrictions of court access 
 
 To determine whether a litigant should be restricted access to court, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit follows a four-factored analysis:14 
 First, the litigant must be afforded due process vis-à-vis reasonable notice and an 
opportunity to oppose a restrictive order’s issuance.15   
 Second, the district court needs to create an adequate record for review, consisting 
of all the cases and/or documents and/or explanations of the reasons that persuaded the 
court to restrict the litigant’s court access.16   
 Third, the district court must find the litigant’s filings to be not only repetitive and 
abusive, but also devoid of an arguable factual or legal basis, or filed with the intent to 
harass.17   
 Fourth, the order to restrict court access must be drawn narrowly to address the 
specific problem encountered.18      
                                                 
10 This power comes from three sources: 1) The Nevada Constitution, which authorizes the state courts to 
issue all writs “proper and necessary to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction.”  NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 
6(1);  2) The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow a district court to impose deterrent sanctions on 
a party pursuing frivolous litigation.  NEV. R. CIV. P. 11;  3) And the Nevada courts’ inherent power of 
equity and control over the exercise of their jurisdiction.  See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th 
Cir. 1990)(recognizing that the federal courts’ inherent power to regulate abusive litigation activities 
includes enjoining a litigant’s right to access the courts under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
11 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 391-391.7 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8803(e) (1999); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.093 (West Supp. 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634J (Michie 1993); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon 2002). 
12 NEV. R. CIV. P. 11. 
13 NEV. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(B). 
14 De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1990). 
15 Id. at 1147. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1147. 
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 In Jordan, the Nevada Supreme Court adopts this standard for the first time with 
regard to in proper person litigants with in forma pauperis status. 
 
Other Jurisdictions — The Spears Approach regarding pre-service complaint 
reviews 
 
 In order to determine how to handle potentially frivolous litigation filed in forma 
pauperis, some jurisdictions, including the Mississippi Supreme Court19 and the Georgia 
Court of Appeals,20 follow the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
decision, Spears v. McCotter.21  Spears found that, under the federal in forma pauperis 
statute,22 courts may hold preliminary evidentiary hearings to determine whether a 
complaint is frivolous without first determining the merit of an accompanying in forma 
pauperis application.      
 In Jordan, the Nevada Supreme Court reconfirms that Nevada largely follows 
Spears except that Nevada courts must rule on the in forma application first before they 
may review the complaint.23 
 
Effect of Jordan on Current Law 
 
 With regard to restriction of court access to in proper person litigants with in 
forma pauperis status, the Nevada Supreme Court now requires that district courts follow 
the Ninth Circuit’s four-factor analysis in deciding how and under what conditions a 
restriction may be levied.  This criterion breaks with the less rigid, more discretionary 
standard that the judges used when restricting Jordan’s and Luckett’s court access.     
 With regard to pre-service complaint reviews for in proper person litigants with in 
forma pauperis status, Jordan does not make new law but reconfirms that, as opposed to 
Spears, Nevada district courts must review the merits of the application before reviewing 
those of the attached complaint.  The Nevada Supreme Court also emphasizes in Jordan 
that dismissal of a frivolous or incomprehensible complaint is a last resort, and that the 
litigant should be given the opportunity to amend it if the legal claims have merit.   
 
Unanswered Questions 
 
 In requiring Nevada district courts to follow the Ninth Circuit’s analysis when 
restricting court access, the Nevada Supreme Court raises this question:  How should 
district courts carry out the individual steps?   
 The first requirement, that the litigant must be afforded due process,24 is vague as 
to what constitutes proper due process.  In addition, because restriction to court access is 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Id. at 1148. 
19 Blanks v. State, 594 So. 2d 25, 28 (Miss. 1992), abrogated in part by Bilbo v. Thigpen, 647 So. 2d 678 
(Miss. 1994). 
20 Brown v. Diaz, 361 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). 
21 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), abrogated in party by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 323 (1989), 
modified in part by statute as recognized in Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1998). 
22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 
23 In accordance with NEV. REV. STAT. 12.015 (2003). 
24 De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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a serious sanction, perhaps in proper person litigants with in forma pauperis status should 
be given a longer notice period; this would be especially important to a proper person 
litigant who would like to seek pro-bono services and needs extra time to do so.    
 The second requirement, which requires the district court create an adequate 
record for review,25 is vague as to the amount of cases, etc. that is necessary to create an 
adequate record.  Perhaps there should be a required number of cases and a certain level 
of description required to help guide the district courts. 
 The third requirement, that the district court must find the litigant’s filings to be 
repetitive and abusive,26 does not define what constitutes repetitive and abusive.  Perhaps 
courts should consider litigation repetitive if it surpasses a certain number. 
 And the last requirement, that the order to restrict court access must be drawn 
narrowly to address the specific problem encountered,27 may result in orders that are 
drawn too narrow to be effective.  Narrow orders may allow restricted litigants to find a 
way to gain court access by disingenuously veiling an unmeritorious complaint as a 
fundamental rights issue. 
 In addition, although the Ninth Circuit analysis is spelled out in a case brought by 
a litigant with in forma pauperis status,28 nowhere in the opinion does the court say that 
the four-part analysis applies just to in forma pauperis litigants who abuse the system; 
furthermore, nowhere in that case does the court say that the litigant was in proper 
person.  Yet Jordan’s holding that Nevada district courts have “the authority to limit the 
court access of a litigant proceeding in proper person with in forma pauperis status”29 
seems to exclude vexatious litigants who have legal representation and money to pay 
court costs.  It seems that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis should apply to all litigants, 
especially if they are unbowed by monetary sanctions or professional discipline.  But 
whether the Nevada Supreme Court agrees is unclear in Jordan.   
 
 
Conclusion 
   
Jordan defines the contours of how restriction to court access and the pre-service 
complaint review may be used while still protecting the constitutional rights of a proper 
person litigant with in forma pauperis status. 
The Ninth Circuit’s method for ordering restricted court access, which requires 
courts to undergo a detailed and multi-faceted analysis, puts a heavy burden on the court 
to find that restricted access is necessary.  By presuming litigants to be viable until 
proven vexatious, courts protect the litigants’ interests and rights up until the point their 
actions warrant remedial measures.  Jordan illustrates that while district courts retain the 
power to dismiss frivolous complaints and restrain court access, they must follow 
procedural safeguards to minimize the chance of litigants being denied due process. 
Meanwhile, by the Nevada district courts reviewing in forma pauperis 
applications prior to the complaint, the litigant is informed of her status prior to the 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1147. 
27 Id. at 1148. 
28 Id. at 1147. 
29 Jordan v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 7 (2005). 
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complaint being reviewed and can proceed accordingly with no fear that a valid 
complaint will be dismissed for financial reasons rather than its legal merit.  In addition, 
the court is relieved from reviewing complaints if the litigant fails to prove in forma 
pauperis status and then fails to pay the appropriate fees.  If the case does proceed to the 
point where the court does review a complaint but finds it incomprehensible, courts must 
allow litigants to amend complaints if they have merit and may only dismiss complaints 
as a last resort.  Jordan reconfirms that pre-service complaint reviews helps both the 
litigant and the court to be more effective and efficient.   
Certainly, future cases brought before Nevada courts will further define the 
contours of the Ninth Circuit’s formula and will give both judges and litigants a clearer 
vision of what warrants restricted court access and who is eligible for such restrictions. 
